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such voters is once begun, it should be extended to all that fall within
that class. If only some voters that are not under the control of the
county school unit are prohibited, the votes of the qualified electors do
not have their proportionate share of weight in the election. When
the Court of Appeals uses the expression "unreasonable regulation of
the franchise," as they have done in this case and many others, they
-undoubtedly mean unreasonable in the sense that it violates either the
rule of "free elections" or the rule of "equal elections". Under this
analysis of the case it is believed that the first reason given by the
Court of Appeals is more far-reaching than the second. With the in-
ferences in mind that can be logically drawn from this case, it is
hard to see how any law which provides for the election of the county
-superintendent by the popular vote of the people can be made valid un-
less it allows all qualified vofers in each county or prohibits all who
do not reside in those portions of the counties that are controlled by
-the county school unit to vote,
HsNRY C. SMITH.
REAL PROPERTY-EXTENT OP EASEMENT AcQUIRED By PnEscRIpToN.
"The right of the owner of the domihant estate is governed by the
-character and the extent of the use of the easement during the prescrip-
tive period." Ferguson v. Standley, 89 Mont. 489, 300 Pac. 245 (1931).
Numerous other cases make similar broad, general statements. "It
(the easement) must be limited to the use for which it is shown by the
-evidence to have been originally designed." Atwater v. Bodflsh, 11
Gray (Mass.) 150 (1850). "The right derived from user can never
outrun or exceed the user in which it has its origin". Amer.-Bank Note
-Co. v. N. Y. Elec. 1. Co., 129 N. Y. 252, 29 N. E. 302 (1891).
Our problem is to determine the application of the above general
statements. This can best be done by first resorting to a review of
the decisions of the courts.
Situations in which it was held that the owner of the prescriptive
-easement did not exceed his rights therein.
Where the defendant has acquired a right of way by adverse user
-iA the matter of carrying materials for, and doing other things in-
cident to, a blacksmith shop, a paint shop, and a carriage shop, and
where, when the buildings in which these shops were housed, burned,
the defendant erected a storehouse and a manufactory, the court held
that, as there was no substantial alteration in the condition or in the
-character of the dominant estate, and as there was no change, except
in degree, in the exercise of the easement, the defendant had not ex-
ceeded his rights in the use of the passway. The court went on to say
that, if the condition and the character of the dominant estate had
been substantially altered, the right of way could not be used for
new purposes, thereby imposing a greater burden on the servient
-estate. Parks v. Bishop, 120 Mass. 340 (1876).
STuDENT NoTEs
The Ilinois Supreme Court, in the case of Sell v. Fine, 295 Ill.
470, 129 N. E.- 90 (1920), held that a defendant who had acquired a
right of way by adverse user had the right to make repairs on the
road over which the easement extended, because the owner of a right
of way may do whatever is reasonably necessary for the reasonable
use of the right of way for the purpose for which it is acquired.
Where an easement consisting of a right of way over a footpath
nas been acquired by prescription by the adverse travel of the mem-
bers of one family residing on the dominant estate, and Its use by
occupants of houses thereafter erected on the dominant estate is shown
not to materially increase the burden on the servient estate, the
occupants of such later erections may use the path; the change in the.
use being in degree but not in kind. Baldwin v. Boston and M. R., 181
Mass. 166, 63 N. E. 428 (1902).
Situations in which it was held that the owner of the prescriptive
easement exceeded his rights therein.
In Atwater v. Bodflish, supra, a prescriptive right of way acquired.
for taking away wood from uncultivated land was held not to entitle.
the owner of such right of way to the use of the way for all purposes.
incidental to cultivated land, with dwellings thereon, the court saying,
that where the nature of the user Is altered by the one having the.
right of way, thereby imposing an added-burden on the servient estate,
such use of the land goes beyond the use to which the owner of the.
way has a right.
A prescriptive right of way for the benefit of two tracts of land
does not permit the use of such way for the benefit of tracts of land
other than the dominant estate, even though such other tracts belong-
to the owner of the dominant estate, the reason being that an added
burden will be placed upon the servient estate. Clark v. Reynolds, 125;
Va. 626; 100 S. E. 468 (1919). Dictum of Cleve v. Nairin, 204 Ky. 342,,
264 S. W. 721 (1924), accord.
In The District of Columbia v. Robinson, 14 App. Cas. (D. C.)
512 (1899), the court held that a right of way acquired by prescrip--
tion does not extend beyond the land actually used in the exercise of
the right of way during the prescriptive period. But where the pass--
way is fenced, the user of the iassway is considered to extend to the
fences, whether or not all of such land was actually gone over in the.
use of the easement. Haffner v. Bittell, 198 Ky. 78, 248 S. W. 22.
(1923).
Prom the above cases, we adduce that: the right of way acquired'
by prescription is limited to the land actually used during the prescrip.
tive period; that persons who come onto the dominant estate after
the acquisition of the right of way may use way, as long as a ma-
terially greater burden is not put upon the servient estate; that rea-
sonable repairs may be made upon it by the owner thereof; that an
easement attached to the dominant estate does not extended to its
use for the benefit of other lands, even though such other lands are
owned by the owner of the dominant estate; and that, In general
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terms, the extent of an easement acquired by prescription is governed
by the clharacter and the extent of the user during the prescriptive
period plus reasonable deviations in degree but not in character, from
the original user, so long as such deviations do not impose a ma-
terially greater burden upon the servient estate.
In the determination of whether or not the dominant owner has
exceeded his rightful use of a prescriptive easement, we are not aided
by the distinctions between character, or nature, and degree, of the use.
This is due largely to the fact that we are unable to reach any satis-
factory working definitions of these terms. Apparently the courts
merely say that an excessive use is a deviation in character or a devia-
tion in degree. As an example of the arbitrariness of the courts in this
matter, let us compare Atwater v. Bodfish, supra, and Parks v. Bishop,
supra. In the former, carrying products from cultivated land was held
to be a deviation in character from the original use of carrying wood
from the same land when it was in an uncultivated state. In the
latter, using the dominant estate for a storehouse and for a manu-
factory, where formerly it was used as a paint shop, a carriage shop,
and a blacksmith shop, was held to be, not a deviation in character,
but a change in the degree of the use. The writer is of the opinion that
the real distinction between these two cases is that in the former a
materially greater burden was imposed on the servient estate, whereas
in the later case the added burden to the servient estate was not ma-
trially greater.
Thus it is submitted that the proper method of handling the
problem of the extent of a prescriptive easement-a method which
will reach the same results as have the courts-is to hold that the
user acquired is governed by the prescriptive user, plus reasonable
deviations therefrom, as long as such deviations do not impose a ma-
terially greater burden upon the servient estate.
WUXIAM IELLOn.
EVIDENCE-CMPETENCY or HUSBAND AsM W=ix.
The recent case of Funk v. U. S., 54 Sup. Ct. 212 (1933), considers
the problem of the common law disqualification of husband and wife-
to testify for or against the other in criminal cases. In that case the
petitioner had twice been tried and convicted in a Federal District
Court upon an indictment for conspiracy to violate the National Pro-
hibition Act. The case reached the Supreme Court by the grant of a
writ of certiorari which was limited to the question as to what law
was applicable to the determination of the competency of the wife of
the petitioner as a witness in his behalf. The court, in reversing the
conviction meted out by the District Court and ruling that the wife
was a competent witness in her husband's behalf, said: "a refusal to
permit the wife, upon the ground of interest, to testify in behalf of
her husband, while permitting him, who has the greater interest, to,
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